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Healthcare-associated outbreaks of gastroenteritis are
an increasingly recognized problem, but detailed knowl-
edge of the epidemiology of these events is lacking. We
actively monitored three hospital systems in England for
outbreaks of gastroenteritis in 2002 to 2003. Atotal of 2,154
patients (2.21 cases/1,000 hospital-days) and 1,360 health-
care staff (0.47 cases/1,000 hospital-days) were affected in
227 unit outbreaks (1.33 outbreaks/unit-year). Norovirus,
detected in 63% of outbreaks, was the predominant etio-
logic agent. Restricting new admissions to affected units
resulted in 5,443 lost bed-days. The cost of bed-days lost
plus staff absence was calculated to be £635,000 (U.S.$
1.01 million) per 1,000 beds. By our extrapolation, gas-
troenteritis outbreaks likely cost the English National Health
Service £115 million (U.S.$ 184 million) in 2002 to 2003.
Outbreaks were contained faster (7.9 vs. 15.4 days,
p = 0.0023) when units were rapidly closed to new admis-
sions (<4 days). Implementing control measures rapidly
may be effective in controlling outbreaks.
N
osocomial gastroenteritis outbreaks, particularly
those caused by noroviruses, have become increas-
ingly important in Europe (1) and North America and have
attracted media interest (2–4). However, unlike the case of
bloodstream, surgical-site, respiratory, skin, and urinary
tract infections, tools for detecting and measuring hospital-
associated gastroenteritis outbreaks have not been well
developed. Accurate measurement of incidence and cost of
these infections is precluded (5–8).
In England and Wales, the Health Protection Agency
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre has operated a
passive surveillance system for gastroenteritis outbreaks.
From 1992 to 2000, information was collected on >5,000
outbreaks, 27% of which occurred in hospitals and 28% in
residential facilities, primarily nursing homes (1,3). Of
these outbreaks, >50% were caused by norovirus, and 25%
were presumed viral on the basis of clinical signs and
symptoms and outbreak characteristics, including high fre-
quency of vomiting, short duration of illness, and short
incubation period (1). Particular patterns of transmission
have been observed in the outbreaks in healthcare facilities,
in which economic effects are likely to be considerable (3). 
Because noroviruses are the most common cause of
gastroenteritis in the community (9), keeping the virus
from being introduced into healthcare settings is difficult,
particularly in winter months. For this reason, control
measures focus on minimizing the spread of virus within
and between hospital units (10). Closing a unit to new
patient admissions, excluding affected staff from work for
48 hours postrecovery, and rigorous disinfection are the
key features of current control guidelines. 
Studies have reported that annually 20%–25% of the
population has gastroenteritis (11); however, these surveys
excluded persons in healthcare facilities (9). Although
many hospital outbreaks of gastroenteritis have been
described (12–14), information from systematic, popula-
tion-based surveillance of gastroenteritis in healthcare set-
tings is lacking (10). 
We performed active surveillance of hospital outbreaks
of gastroenteritis to determine incidence, microbiologic
cause, economic cost, and effectiveness of control meas-
ures in the county of Avon, England, an area likely to be
broadly representative of England as a whole. 
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Surveillance System
Clinical Definitions
Since this surveillance system is designed for detecting
outbreaks of gastroenteritis, a two-tiered definition (of
cases and outbreaks) was required (Figure 1). These defi-
nitions, which draw on Kaplan’s criteria of an outbreak of
viral gastroenteritis (15), were developed in consultation
with public health professionals at all levels of infection
control. Ethical approval for this work was obtained from
the South West Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee. 
Study Population
Gastroenteritis, particularly of viral etiology, is incon-
sistently reported (16). The county of Avon, England, was
selected to focus efforts on collecting complete, high-
quality data. The all-cause, age-standardized death rate,
and deprivation measures and age distribution indicate that
the population of Avon is very similar to that of the whole
of England and Wales (http://www.avon.nhs.uk). 
Three National Health Service administrations (known
as NHS Trusts), comprising four major acute hospitals
(similar to secondary/tertiary hospitals in the United
States) and 11 smaller community hospitals (similar to pri-
mary-level hospitals in the United States) that operate in
the sentinel area, were monitored under the surveillance
network. Combined, these hospitals have 2,900 inpatient
beds, which, on average, maintain 95.6% occupancy of
their acute-care beds. In total, 171 “functional care units”
were monitored; these units were defined as a room, area
or ward regarded as a self-contained area that monitored
171 inpatients. The median number of beds on an inpatient
unit was 20 (range 1–38), which reflects the large size of
units in NHS hospitals compared to those in many other
European or North American designs. 
Nursing, medical, and other staff members were includ-
ed in the population at risk. Time-at-risk for staff members
was collected from whole-time equivalent staffing levels
supplied by human resources departments. Time-at-risk for
patients was calculated by using bed occupancy data from
the administration system. 
Surveillance and Outbreak Investigation
Each NHS Trust has an infection control team that
includes a medically trained microbiologist, a senior infec-
tion control nurse, and a team of dedicated infection con-
trol nurses. Atotal of 11 infection control nurses worked at
the three trusts. Infection control nurses were responsible
for monitoring the populations in their hospitals. Infection
control nurses became aware of outbreaks during ward
rounds or were alerted to incidents by nurses working on
wards. When an event occurred that met the definition of
an outbreak (Figure 1), institutions were requested to con-
tact the study coordinator at the Health Protection Agency
in Colindale, London. The study coordinator was responsi-
ble for ensuring completeness of reports, overseeing data
entry, and performing analyses. The study coordinator also
solicited monthly null reports in months that no outbreaks
were reported in order to confirm that no outbreaks
occurred.
Sampling and Diagnostics
Staff members who managed outbreaks were asked to
take specimens from the first 10 patients in an outbreak for
virologic analysis and from the first 3 patients for bacterial
analysis. Such a large number was suggested because of the
low sensitivity of viral diagnostics (17). Fecal specimens
were preferred, but vomit samples were also accepted for
virologic testing. Explicit instructions, based on the Health
Protection Agency standard operating procedure (18–19),
about taking and sending the samples, were provided.
Specimens were tested for viral pathogens at the regional
public health laboratory. Specimens were first screened
with an in-house enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA), followed by reverse transcription–polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) for detection of norovirus (20,21).
Outbreak Data
Case forms and an outbreak summary form were com-
pleted by infection control nurses as an outbreak pro-
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Figure 1. Definition of an outbreak of gastroenteritis in healthcare
settings.gressed. Forms were returned by mail shortly after an out-
break ended. The duration of an outbreak was calculated as
the number of days from the onset of the first case to the
onset of the last case.
Statistical Analysis
Data were entered and stored in an Access (Microsoft,
Redmond, WA) database. Analyses were performed on
Microsoft Excel and Stata 8.0 (22). The ttest was used to
compare means; the χ2 test was used to compare propor-
tions. Continuous data were analyzed with linear regres-
sion. Spearman rank test was used to assess correlation of
seasonal patterns.
Economic Analysis
The National Health Service of England is a socialized
healthcare system. Funding originates from taxpayer
money and is distributed by the Department of Health.
Resources are allocated to Primary Care Trusts, which
commission hospital services from NHS Hospital Trusts
(23). Allocations are based on the age distribution of the
population served by the hospitals, with adjustments made
for maternal needs, mental health, and ambulatory needs of
the population (24). Thus, funding is not directly based on
the services provided. If healthcare provision is disrupted
by an avoidable event, such as hospital-acquired infection,
the allocated resources are not used optimally. In other
words, opportunity costs (the difference between actual
performance of an investment and the optimum expected
outcome) are incurred. 
We analyzed the opportunity costs of nosocomial gas-
troenteritis outbreaks to the healthcare service and lost pro-
ductivity of patients (and the families of pediatric
patients). Bed-day loss from new admission restriction for
affected units and staff absence from illness were estimat-
ed as the two main costs related to gastroenteritis out-
breaks in hospitals. Other possible economic effects may
include cancelled operations, overuse of beds caused by
delayed discharge, additional cleaning procedures, and
increased drug prescribing. However, these costs are prob-
ably limited, since the illness is relatively short-lived,
cleaning is a relatively minor expense, and no treatment is
available for viral gastroenteritis except rehydration. We
also estimated the societal cost of lost productivity from
missed days of work. Intangible costs, such as pain and
psychological distress from delayed or cancelled opera-
tions and admissions, which are difficult to quantify (25),
were not calculated. 
Figures from the Unit Costs of Health and Social Care
2002 report were used to estimate the economic loss from
empty beds and staff absence (26). Average wage estimates
for England were obtained from the Office of National
Statistics (27). All costs are in Great British pounds (2002)
and converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of £1: $1.6, based
on the 5-year average 1999–2003 (http://www.forexdirec-
tory.net/home.html). 
For economic estimates, the following assumptions
were made. Staff members were, on average, grade E nurs-
es, the mid-range of NHS nursing staff. This figure is prob-
ably an underestimate of cost since medical staff, who
have higher wages, were also affected in outbreaks. A lost
bed-day is a real economic loss in terms of opportunity
cost. Since these trusts operate at >95% occupancy of
inpatient beds, the result is bed-days lost because the bed
would likely have been used. These expenditures cannot
be reallocated since infection control guidelines stipulate
that staff members from affected units are not to work on
unaffected units, and patients from affected units are not to
be transferred to unaffected units (10).
Patients of working age (18–64 for men and 18–59 for
women) and one family member of each pediatric patient
(<18 years) were assumed to be economically active. We
assumed that 5 of 7 days of work were missed for each day
of illness in these categories. This figure is an overestimate
since many days of hospital-acquired gastroenteritis illness
would have been spent in the hospital whether the person
acquired gastroenteritis or not. Individual length-of-stay
data were not available. Hospital staff absence was con-
sidered a cost to the healthcare sector, rather than society.
Results
Outbreaks, Cases, and Incidence
In the 171 inpatient units followed, a total of 227 out-
breaks occurred; the outbreak incidence was 1.33 out-
breaks per unit-year of risk (95% confidence interval [CI]
1.16–1.51) (Figures 2 and 3). All enrolled hospital trusts
were affected by outbreaks. Hospital outbreaks peaked in
November, with 46 affected units. Asmaller peak occurred
July, with 22 outbreaks. 
Within the 227 outbreaks, 2,154 hospital patients and
1,360 hospital staff met the case definition. The incidence
among patients was 2.21 cases per 1,000 hospital-days at
risk (95% CI 2.16–2.25) and among staff was 0.47 cases
per 1,000 hospital-days at risk (95% CI 0.45–0.50). Units
with outbreaks were significantly larger than those that did
not have an outbreak in the study period (21.4 vs. 12.6, p
value < 0.0001, ttest).
Diagnostic Results
Specimens were taken for diagnostic analyses in 122
(51%) of the 227 hospital unit outbreaks (Table 1).
Norovirus was the confirmed etiologic agent in 61 out-
breaks (50%) and was detected in a single specimen in 16
outbreaks (13%). The second most prevalent organism
was  Clostridium difficile, which was confirmed in nine
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outbreaks (6.5%). Six outbreaks (4.9%) occurred in which
both norovirus and C. difficile were detected. Rotavirus
and  Campylobacter  outbreaks were also detected.
Outbreaks from which all specimens were negative for
rotavirus and Campylobacter (n = 31, 25%) had a season-
al pattern similar to that of norovirus outbreaks (p = 0.13,
Spearman rank test) (Figure 3). The monthly distribution
of outbreaks in which no specimens were taken correlated
with the monthly distribution of norovirus-confirmed out-
breaks.
Attack Rates within Outbreaks
In hospital outbreaks, attack rates among staff members
(staff affected/staff working on unit: 19.6%, 95% CI
16.6%–22.7%) were significantly lower than those of
patients (patients affected/unit beds: 46.8%, 95% CI
40.9%–52.8%) (p < 0.001, ttest). In outbreaks in which
norovirus was the confirmed etiologic agent, attack rates
were somewhat higher than all outbreaks at 24.5% for staff
(95% CI 17.8%–31.2%) and 53.2% for patients (95% CI
41.5%–65.0%), although not significantly so. Attack rates
among staff were not higher in the first outbreak (20.6%;
95% CI 16.4%–25.0%) compared to subsequent outbreaks
that occurred in the same unit (21.5%; 95% CI 17.2–25.9)
(p = 0.8; t-test). 
Closing Units to New Admissions 
and Bed-Day Loss
One hundred and fifty-eight (69.6%) of the 227 hospi-
tal unit outbreaks resulted in the affected unit’s being
closed to new admissions (Table 2). Outbreaks in which
norovirus was detected did not result in unit closure to new
admissions more frequently than outbreaks in which diag-
nostic results were negative (71.3% compared to 70.6%,
respectively) (p = 0.9, χ2 test). 
Units were closed for a mean of 9.65 (95% CI
8.5–10.8) days, but in the most extreme example, a unit
was closed to new admissions for 48 days because of a sin-
gle outbreak. On average, 3.57 (95% CI 1.86–5.2) bed-
days were lost for every day of unit closure to new admis-
sions, which resulted in an estimated 5,443 bed-days lost
from gastroenteritis outbreaks.
Economic Loss
Unit closures to new admissions were distributed
among unit type specialties (Table 3). The cost of empty
beds to the three hospitals was £1.49 million (U.S.$ 2.24
million) or approximately £480,000 (U.S.$ 768,000) per
1,000 beds. 
Costs associated with staff absence were calculated as
shown in Table 4. A total of 1,360 infections were in staff
members; mean duration of illness was 2.4 days. Hospital
staff members were advised not to work for 2 days after
recovering from gastrointestinal illness (10). If the staff
members work 5 days a week, an estimated 3.14 days of
work were missed because of  illness [(2.4 days ill + 2 days
absence postrecovery) x (5 working days/7 days)]. The
cost of one day absence was £113 (U.S.$ 181); therefore,
outbreaks cost £482,000 (U.S.$ 771,000) or £156,000
(U.S.$ 249,000) per 1,000 beds. Total cost of bed-day loss
and staff absence was £1.97 million (U.S.$ 3.15 million),
or £635,000 million (U.S.$ 1.01 million) per 1,000 beds.
A total of 971 days of illness occurred among working
age men (433 days), working age women (241 days), and
children  <18 years of age (297 days). Therefore, 139
(971/5 x 5/7) 5-day work weeks were potentially lost. At
£476 (U.S.$ 761) per week, total productivity loss is esti-
mated to be £66,000 (U.S.$ 106,000) or £22,700 (U.S.$
36,400) per 1,000 beds.
Restricting New Admissions
Information about unit closure was available for 52
(85%) of the 61 norovirus-confirmed outbreaks. Forty-
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Figure 2. Monthly outbreaks of gastroenteritis in hospitals, Avon,
England, April 2002–March 2003 (N = 227). 
Figure 3. Monthly distribution of outbreaks with diagnostic results
(N = 122). Negative outbreaks followed a similar seasonal pattern
to norovirus outbreaks. u, unconfirmed (only one positive speci-
men). nine (94%) of these outbreaks resulted in the unit’s being
closed to new admissions, but only 7 (13.7%) were closed
within 3 days of the date of onset of the primary case.
Outbreaks in which the affected unit was closed within the
first 3 days were contained in a mean 7.9 days (95 % CI
4.3–11.5); outbreaks in units that were not closed or were
closed >3 days after the first case lasted for a mean of 15.4
days (95% CI: 13.6–17.3) (p value = 0.002, t-test).
Although not reaching levels of statistical significance, the
attack rates for patients (0.52 compared to 0.68, p = 0.38),
staff members (0.14 compared to 0.27, p = 0.21), and all
cases (16.3 compared to 23.7, p = 0.065) all increased if
the unit was not shut within 3 days. Units closed within 3
days of outbreak were not different from other units in
terms of size, according to linear regression models. Unit
size and specialty did not affect the estimated cost of clos-
ing the unit to new admissions. 
Discussion
In our study, the first published systematic assessment
of healthcare-associated gastroenteritis outbreaks (primari-
ly caused by noroviruses), we have demonstrated the cost
of such outbreaks. On average, each hospital unit (or ward)
had 1.33 outbreaks in the 1-year follow-up period. To con-
trol the spread of disease as recommended in national
guidelines (10), 158 of the 227 outbreaks resulted in clos-
ing the unit to new admissions. This closure resulted in
5,443 lost bed-days, ≈0.5% of all available acute bed-days.
This bed loss, combined with staff absence, cost an esti-
mated £635,000 (U.S.$ 1.01 million) per 1,000 beds. The
measures taken to control the outbreak are costly, but these
data indicate that they may be effective in controlling the
duration of an outbreak. Units closed within the first 3
days of an outbreak are contained faster than those not
closed or closed after day 4 (7.9 vs. 15.4 days; p = 0.002). 
The incidence rates in hospital patients and hospital
staff were determined to be 2.21 and 0.47 cases per 1,000
hospital-days of risk, respectively. In other words, a
patient who spent a year in the hospital would have an
80% chance of having a case of gastroenteritis during an
outbreak. This estimate translates to a 1.5% chance for
the average inpatient length of stay (≈7 days). Full-time
hospital staff members had a 17% chance of being affect-
ed during the year of follow-up. Norovirus was the
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unit outbreaks. 
The strength of this study and the high quality of data
collected were due to the active and systematic approach.
The definitions were designed to ascertain outbreaks by
using a clear designation of the spatial boundaries. Thus, if
infection spread from one unit to another, the events were
counted as two separate outbreaks. However, the role of
sporadic gastroenteritis in healthcare settings was not
assessed in this study. The study team applied standard
case and outbreak definitions. Null reporting was used on
a monthly basis to confirm that an outbreak had not
occurred when none was reported. The full range of mod-
ern diagnostics for viral gastroenteritis, including ELISA
and RT-PCR assays, was used. However, even using these
tests, viral pathogens are not always identified (17). The
seasonal pattern of outbreaks in which all specimens were
negative in this study suggests that many may also have
been caused by noroviruses.
In 2002, norovirus epidemics occurred in the United
States, England, Wales, and the rest of Europe (28,29),
raising the question: Are the figures reported here repre-
sentative or the product of an anomalous year? For this
reason, this surveillance will continue in forthcoming
years to determine whether the cost of the 2002–2003 sea-
son is characteristic or not.
Noroviruses are the predominant agent for outbreaks of
gastroenteritis in healthcare settings, a finding that is con-
sistent with previous studies from the United States (4),
Sweden (30), and historical surveillance data from
England and Wales (1,3). However, our study extends
these etiologic studies by determining the economic cost of
gastroenteritis outbreaks and incidence rates in a defined
population. The rates of infection were highest in children
and the elderly (31). We could not assess whether length of
stay was directly affected by hospital-acquired gastroen-
teritis or whether death rates increased, since these data
were not available.
At U.S.$ 1 million per 1,000 beds, the direct costs to the
health sector are substantial and outweigh the indirect cost
of lost productivity (overestimated to be U.S.$ 36,400 per
1,000 beds.) This proportional cost to health service is
largely because of the age distribution of hospital popula-
tions that were affected: <20% of patients were pediatric
patients or economically active. Other healthcare sector
costs, such as cancelled operations, bed blocking from
delayed discharge, additional cleaning procedures, and
increased drug prescribing, could be estimated in future
studies. However, these costs are probably limited since
the illness is relatively short-lived, cleaning is a relatively
minor expense, and viral gastroenteritis has no treatment
except rehydration. For these reasons, the indirect cost of
nosocomial gastroenteritis outbreaks in the community at
large are probably small compared to the indirect cost of
other hospital-acquired infections that can require postdis-
charge treatment. However, these results demonstrate the
direct effect of nosocomial gastroenteritis outbreaks on
healthcare. 
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total net revenue expenditure divided by the total number
of inpatient days (26). Thus, cost per bed-day includes
overhead expenses, medical and nursing staff payroll, and
equipment and treatment costs. U.K. guidelines stipulate
that staff members or patients (ill or well) from affected
units are to be excluded from unaffected units (10). In
other words, as a measure to control further spread, reallo-
cation of resources is prohibited by the guidelines. This
restriction can be seen in terms of opportunity cost or a
reduction from maximum efficiency. For example,
although staff members who are not ill remain at work,
they cannot be assigned to other units. Thus, when beds
become empty, new admissions are restricted, and nursing
services will not be used at maximum efficiency. The
quantity of care will decrease, and the resources allocated
towards such care will not decline.
Hospital-acquired infections have been estimated to
cost the NHS £930 million (U.S. $1,488 million) annually
(32). If these costs are distributed evenly across the NHS,
hospital-acquired infections would cost the three NHS
Trusts (1.7% of all beds in the United Kingdom) in this
study £16 million (U.S.$ 25.6 million). Our study suggests
that gastroenteritis outbreaks account for 12.5% of that
cost, and similar to urinary tract infections, are the most
costly healthcare-acquired infection to NHS (32), costing
£115 million (U.S.$ 184 million) or ≈1% of the total inpa-
tient services budget. Attributing costs to healthcare-
acquired infections is complex, particularly in the case of
gastroenteritis outbreaks, because little of the added
expense will go directly toward the affected patient. 
Not admitting susceptible patients is an effective means
of containing nosocomial norovirus outbreaks.
Recognizing outbreaks of viral gastroenteritis in hospitals
can be difficult because of the high frequency of inconti-
nence and other causes of gastroenteritis, such as antimi-
crobial-associated diarrhea. ELISA diagnostic kits
facilitate rapid diagnosis of norovirus infections (17).
Hospital infection control teams should be encouraged to
take fecal samples from patients with suspected cases of
viral gastroenteritis and to seek diagnoses. A positive con-
firmation of norovirus should result in immediate restric-
tion of new admissions to the affected unit. Our data
suggest that this restriction can be achieved within 3 days
of diagnosis of the first case, approximately 1 week of the
outbreak’s duration can be prevented.
High levels of bed occupancy, the large size of care
units, and lack of isolation units in NHS hospitals may
make them particularly vulnerable to norovirus outbreaks.
Cohorting affected patients is difficult in English hospitals.
Units are large (median 20 beds, in this study) and occu-
pancy is very high (>95%), so patients are not easily
maneuvered. Policies, procedures, and building design
may have major effects on transmission of these infections
and should be explored by epidemic modeling, institution-
al clinical trials, and international studies that analyze the
effect of the environment. Thus, our cost estimates are spe-
cific to the context of the English NHS. A hospital system
that operated at a lower bed-occupancy level or those with
smaller numbers of beds per unit may be able to provide
nursing care to affected patients, with minimal effect on
occupancy or other hospital processes. Economic analyses
should be specifically tailored to the healthcare system that
is being assessed. 
Previous studies on the cost of hospital-acquired infec-
tions may have underestimated the effect of gastrointesti-
nal infections because surveillance methods for such
outbreaks have historically been lacking. This analysis of
an active, enhanced surveillance scheme of three major
hospital administrations in a defined geographic area
quantifies the cost of gastroenteritis outbreaks to the health
service, the important etiologic role of noroviruses, and the
positive effect of control efforts. 
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